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Abstract—Tor users are vulnerable to deanonymization by
an adversary that can observe some Tor relays or some parts
of the network. We demonstrate that previous network-aware
path-selection algorithms that propose to solve this problem are
vulnerable to attacks across multiple Tor connections. We suggest
that users use trust to choose the paths through Tor that are
less likely to be observed, where trust is flexibly modeled as a
probability distribution on the location of the user’s adversaries,
and we present the Trust-Aware Path Selection algorithm for Tor
that helps users avoid traffic-analysis attacks while still choosing
paths that could have been selected by many other users. We
evaluate this algorithm in two settings using a high-level map of
Internet routing: (i) users try to avoid a single global adversary
that has an independent chance to control each Autonomous
System organization, Internet Exchange Point organization, and
Tor relay family, and (ii) users try to avoid deanonymization by
any single country. We also examine the performance of Trust-
Aware Path selection using the Shadow network simulator.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tor is a popular tool for low-latency anonymous commu-
nication, with over an estimated 1.5 million daily users. In
order to use Tor to communicate with others, clients choose a
three-hop path from the set of over 7000 relays volunteering
bandwidth to the network. In order to balance load among
the relays, and in particular to optimize the allocation of
Tor’s limited bandwidth, the default path selection algorithm
is bandwidth-weighted so that a client will select a relay with
a probability equivalent to the ratio of that relay’s available
bandwidth to the total network bandwidth capacity. Clients
communicate with arbitrary Internet hosts via a cryptographic
circuit with a layer of encryption for each of the three relays on
its path, which are termed the entry guard, middle, and exit,
according to their position on the path. Because this circuit
is built using a telescoping process, it provides unlinkability
against a passive, non-global adversary that cannot observe
both ends of the circuit.
Unfortunately for many Tor users, a global adversary that
can observe both ends has become a very real and significant
threat. An adversary in such a position can perform a “first-
last” traffic-correlation attack for any of the circuit’s streams
(i.e., TCP connections to destinations multiplexed over cir-
cuits) by using similarities in the volume and timing of the
traffic at both ends to match them with each other, thereby
deanonymizing the user. These techniques are efficient and
effective [28]. In order to carry out traffic-correlation attacks,
an adversary must be in a position to (i) observe Tor traffic
on an Internet path between a client and its chosen entry
guard or control that entry guard, and (ii) observe an Internet
path between the selected exit relay and the destination or
control the exit or destination. Due to Tor’s volunteer-relay
model and its bandwidth-weighted path-selection algorithm,
an adversary may get in a position to observe a large amount
of traffic simply by running a fast relay, and it can otherwise
observe traffic by controlling or coercing entities on the paths
to and from relays including Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
Autonomous Systems (ASes), and Internet Exchange Points
(IXPs).
Previous approaches to improving resilience against traffic
observation and correlation attacks have been limited in nature
and only consider specific threats. One main approach focuses
on defeating an adversary that observes an AS or IXP [7], [9],
[13], [15], [24], [29], [30] and suggests creating Tor circuits
such that the set of ASes and IXPs that appear on the Internet
paths between the client and guard is disjoint from the set
of ASes and IXPs between the exit and destination. However,
this solution ignores the critical effects of multiple connections
over Tor, which under this approach leak increasing amounts of
information that can allow the adversary to determine a client’s
location. We present attacks of this nature on Astoria [30], a
recent proposal of this sort, with our results showing that even
a moderately-resourced adversary can identify the client’s AS
within seconds. These attacks have similar implications for all
path-selection proposals using this approach.
The other main approach focuses on an adversary that
can observe some Tor relays [21], [22] and suggests that,
for the most sensitive circuit positions, users choose a small
number of relays from among those the user trusts the most.
However, this approach leaks information to an adversary that
can eventually identify the trusted relays (e.g., via a congestion
attack [14], [16]) and uses a restrictive trust model. No existing
solution to traffic correlation attacks provides protection from
the variety of attacker resources and tactics that recent research
and experience suggests is realistic [23].
In contrast, this paper develops defenses against traffic
correlation that are based on a general probabilistic model
of network adversaries. Using this model we can consider
adversaries with diverse resources, such as those that observe
network traffic at any combination of network providers, ex-
change points, physical cables (undersea or elsewhere), and Tor
relays. The model allows us to incorporate uncertainty about
and randomness in an adversary’s actions. It also enables us
to express common factors underlying the adversaries’ ability
to compromise different network locations, such as shared
legal jurisdiction or corporate ownership. A user expresses a
trust belief about her adversaries by specifying a probability
distribution over their presence at a set of network locations,
and she turns this belief into a trust policy by including
a weight for each adversary indicating her relative level of
concern about that adversary.
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Using these trust policies, we design Trust-Aware Path
Selection (TAPS), a novel path-selection algorithm that uses
trust in network elements to inform a user’s decision about how
to select relays for its Tor path. Using TAPS, clients select
paths so as to minimize the probability that an adversary is
in a position to observe both ends of their Tor circuit while
at the same time ensuring that their path selection behavior
does not harm their security by making them stand out from
other clients. In addition to defending against a much broader
class of adversaries, TAPS addresses the other deficiencies
of prior proposals. In particular, it provides security against
an adversary that can monitor and link user activity across
multiple connections, influence how users make connections,
and identify the relays used repeatedly by a client.
In order to facilitate the adoption of TAPS, we describe
both a long-term and a short-term deployment strategy. In
the long-term strategy, all Tor users participate and use the
TrustAll version of TAPS to replace Tor’s existing bandwidth-
weighted algorithm. In the short-term strategy, TAPS provides
the option for security-conscious users to use trust to defend
against traffic-correlation attacks while most users continue to
use “vanilla” Tor (i.e., bandwidth-weighted path selection). We
design the TrustOne TAPS version for this case, in which users
must both avoid traffic correlation and choose paths that blend
in with the vanilla Tor users.
We evaluate the security of TAPS via simulation with
modified versions of the Tor Path Simulator (TorPS) [23]. This
evaluation is done with respect to two plausible and illustrative
trust policies: (i) The Man policy, in which a single adversary
has an independent probability of compromising each AS
organization (i.e., group of ASes run by the same entity), IXP
organization, and self-declared relay family (i.e., set of relays
run by the same entity) in Tor; and (ii) the Countries policy,
in which each country is considered a potential adversary and
observes all ASes, IXPs, and relays located inside of it. Our
analysis of The Man policy for a popular Tor client location
shows a reduction in the probability of a successful first-last
attack from about 0.7 to about 0.4 in TrustAll with typical web-
browsing activity over the first week in December 2013, and
from about 0.68 to as little as 0.1 in TrustOne with repeated
connections over the same week to a single IRC server popular
with Tor developers. Our analysis of the Countries policy over
that week shows a reduction in the median number of countries
that “unnecessarily” compromise a stream (i.e., compromise a
stream when they don’t contain both the client and destination)
from 5 to 2 in TrustAll with typical user behavior.
Our algorithms are designed not only to improve security,
but also to allow security to be traded off for performance.
They achieve this by allowing clients to configure the fraction
of bandwidth weight that their trusted sets of candidate guards
and exits should exceed before making a bandwidth-weighted
choice from them. This mechanism results in a client selecting
from among the most secure relays while still making use of
much of the network and doing so in a bandwidth-weighted
manner. We explore these trade-offs using the Shadow simula-
tor [3], [19] and find that there exist parameters that result in
only a slight decrease in performance, and only for less than
5 percent of users.
This is the full version of the conference paper [20]. The
additions in this version include a discussion of repeated-
connection attacks and a measurement-based study of the risk
of cross-circuit attacks.
II. ATTACKS ON NETWORK-AWARE PATH SELECTION
There have been several proposals to improve Tor security
by considering the network entities (e.g., AS or IXP) that
can observe a circuit [7], [9], [13], [15], [24], [30]. However,
none of these works considers anonymity across multiple
Tor connections. Any realistic use of Tor involves multiple
connections from the same user, though, and these connections
are linkable by the adversary in many important cases, which
means that it doesn’t suffice to consider the security of an
individual connection. Indeed, we present two specific attacks
that can deanonymize users by identifying and analyzing
multiple connections from the same user.
While there have been several proposals for network-
aware path selection, we focus on just one for concreteness:
Astoria [30]. It is among the most recent and complete
proposals, and it provides a valuable example as many of
the others suffer the same weaknesses. Astoria is designed to
prevent deanonymization by an AS (or group of sibling ASes
controlled by the same organization). To choose a circuit for
a given destination, a client determines the ASes between the
client and its guards and between the exits and the destination.
It then makes a bandwidth-weighted random choice from
among the guard-exit pairs such that no AS appears on both
the client side and the destination side. If no such pair exists,
a linear program is used to determine the selection distribution
over guard-exit pairs that minimizes the maximum probability
that some AS appears on both sides. Circuits are reused for
destinations within the same AS.
Chosen-Destination Attack: Consider an adversary that runs
a number of web servers in different locations and runs some
Tor relays. If a Tor user visits one of the malicious web servers,
the adversary can force the browser to visit the other malicious
servers and request resources that are linkable to the original
request (e.g., images with unique names). The adversary will
then observe the pattern of exits chosen by the client to visit
the servers in different locations, and it will also observe
some of the client’s guards if the malicious relays are ever
selected in the middle position. This attack strategy applies
more generally to any situation in which the adversary can
choose the destinations that the client visits and is able to link
those connections as originating at the same client.
Under this attack, path-selection algorithms that choose re-
lays based on the client’s location can leak increasing amounts
of information about that location with each additional desti-
nation visited. This is the case for Astoria, and we demonstrate
that this attack is effective on that system.
To demonstrate the attack, we construct an AS-level In-
ternet map using traceroute-based topology data and inferred
AS relationships from CAIDA [11] and BGP routing tables
supplied by Route Views [35]. We use the data from these
sources for October 2015. Routes between AS locations on
our map are inferred using the algorithm proposed by Qiu and
Gao [33], which takes AS paths observed in BGP tables and
extends them to other locations using shortest “valley-free”
paths. Conversion of IPs to ASes is performed using routing
prefix tables from Route Views [34].
We also use data from Tor Metrics [5] to evaluate the
attack’s effectiveness as if it were run on the Tor network
in the recent past. We use the archived network consensuses
and server descriptors to determine such facts as which relays
existed, what families they were grouped in, what their relative
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bandwidth capacities were, and what their “exit policies” were.
We use the first network consensus from October 2015 and
its listed descriptors. We also use data from Juen [24] that
identifies 414 Tor client ASes as ever being observed making
a Tor connection and shows their relative popularity. 389 of
these appear in our AS map and are used in our analysis.
The five most popular client ASes identified by Juen, in order
from most popular, are 6128 (Cable Vision Systems, US),
25019 (SaudiNet, SA), 8972 (PlusServer AG, DE), 6893 (Saitis
Network, CH), and 15467 (Enternet Libercom, HU).
We simulate Astoria’s path selections for 1000 destinations
in ASes selected uniformly at random from those 44626 ASes
in a maximal fully-connected component in our map that also
advertise prefixes. For each destination AS, an IP is chosen
arbitrarily from an advertised prefix, and a connection to port
443 is simulated. We repeat the simulation 100 times. We
suppose that the adversary runs the 4 relays with the largest
probabilities of being selected as a middle, which have a
total advertised bandwidth of 1.01 Gbps and a cumulative
probability of 3.3% of being selected as a middle.
Table I shows how often the adversary observes some or all
of the client’s guards when the client uses 3 guards. It shows
that with 100 destinations the adversary observes all guards
with 30% probability, and with 300 destinations it observes
all guards with 94% probability. It sometimes observes guards
even with no destinations due to being selected as a guard.
TABLE I: Probability of observing the client’s guards
Pr. 0 guards
observed
Pr. 1 guard
observed
Pr. 2 guards
observed
Pr. 3 guards
observed
0 destinations 0.96 0.04 0 0
100 destinations 0.04 0.14 0.52 0.30
200 destinations 0 0.01 0.25 0.74
300 destinations 0 0 0.06 0.94
We then consider how well the adversary can guess the
client’s AS after the attack in the case that he observes all of
the client’s guards. We again simulate Astoria’s path selections
for 1000 random destination ASes and repeat the simulation
100 times. We follow Nithyanand et al. [30] in using 3
guards (1 and 2 guards yield similar results). We suppose
that the adversary uses a uniform prior distribution on the
389 client ASes. We then compute the adversary’s conditional
distribution on the client ASes given the observed guard set
and the sequence of exits. The average entropy of the resulting
distributions as we increase the number of attack destinations
is shown for the top 5 client ASes in Figure 1. It shows an
expected steady decrease in entropy for all client locations
as the attacker uses more destinations. By 300 destinations,
all locations result in less than 4 bits of entropy on average,
and by 1000 destinations, the average entropy is less than 2.5
bits for all locations. Identifying the client AS could be very
dangerous for a Tor user, as it can identify the country of that
user as well as the ISP whose network logs could be used
to completely identify the user. Note that this attack could
be completed within the time needed to construct circuits and
open streams on them in parallel, which is on the order of
seconds.
Repeated Connections: Consider a malicious destination to
which a user repeatedly connects over time. A new circuit
is created for each connection that is separated by enough
time and inactivity (Tor uses a new circuit after 10 minutes
by default, although Tor Browser extends this for sufficiently-
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Fig. 1: Avg. entropy of posterior client-AS distribution after chosen-
destination attack on Astoria
frequent connections). Suppose that the adversary can link
those connections as originating at the same user (e.g., by
pseudonymous login at the server). If the adversary also runs
a relay, it can eventually learn both the client’s guard set
(by being used occasionally as the middle relay) and the exit
distribution used to reach the destination from each guard (by
observations at the destination). If these distributions depend
on the user’s location, as in Astoria, the adversary can thus
narrow down the user’s location over time.
Cross-Circuit Attack: Consider a popular website that
causes the user’s browser to fetch resources of (roughly) known
sizes from a set of servers in other ASes. An AS-avoiding
path-selection algorithm like Astoria may create new circuits
for these new destinations that place a malicious AS between
an exit and server on one connection and between the client
and a guard on another connection. If the adversary can link
its observations on those two connections, which it might by
using the timing and amount of traffic on the circuits, then
it can deanonymize the user, effectively performing a cross-
circuit correlation attack. Linking observations across circuits
may be especially easy when the adversary observes the first
connection to a website from an exit because then it can com-
pare traffic on subsequent connections to a traffic fingerprint
that it has previously measured for that website that contains
the timing, amount, and destinations of traffic on connections
initiated by that website. In contrast to the chosen-destination
and repeated-connections attacks, this attack can be performed
when the destinations are honest but some AS is malicious.
This kind of attack enables complete deanonymization by an
AS via timing correlation even when each individual circuit is
not vulnerable to a correlation attack. Figure 2 illustrates an
example of the cross-circuit attack.
We evaluate the potential vulnerability of Astoria to such
an attack by examining how it constructs and uses circuits
when visiting popular websites. To measure the connections
made during such a visit, we use Tor Browser to fetch the
front page from each of the Alexa global top 5000 websites [1].
This process is automated using tor-browser-selenium [39]. We
disable automatic updating and browser caching, and we reload
Tor Browser between each website visit. These steps help
ensure that we only consider streams initiated by the website
visit and that we observe all streams normally initiated by a
fresh visit. We record all of the streams constructed during each
visit using Tor’s control port [38]. For each visit, we extract
a list of the IP addresses and TCP ports to which streams are
opened, excluding any streams generated by automated Tor
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Fig. 2: Example of a cross-circuit attack: a malicious AS observes
the first connection made to a server during a website visit (1), then
observes the client’s connection to a guard on a subsequent connection
during the same website visit (2), and then can conclude that the
observed client visited the observed website.
events such as consensus updates. We remove from these lists
those IP addresses for which a mapping to AS number doesn’t
exist, again using the Route Views data [34] to determine the
mapping. We also manually inspect the returned page contents
to verify that the website loaded successfully.
We used Tor Browser v.6.0.4 to perform a crawl of the
top 5000 sites on September 1st, 2016. Of these, 2573 visits
reached the desired site and resulted in a non-empty list of
IP addresses and ports. Reasons for failure include network
error, interception by CloudFlare, a redirect loop, timeout
(set at 45s), and missing IP-to-AS mappings. Among these
2573 websites, the number of unique pairs of IP address
and TCP port connected to during the visit ranges from a
minimum of 1 to a maximum of 160 with a median number
of 17. This suggests that there are many popular websites for
which Astoria may construct many new circuits and thus be
vulnerable to a cross-circuit attack.
To evaluate this, we simulate circuits in Astoria when
visiting each website much as we simulated Astoria when
evaluating the chosen-destination attack. We again determine
AS-level paths using Qiu-Gao inference on our AS map, we
use the same 389 popular client locations, and we use the same
data from Tor Metrics to model the relays in the Tor network.
Then, for each of the 2573 websites reached successfully
and for each client location, we simulate 100 times how
Astoria would create and use circuits to reach the sequence of
addresses and ports that were observed for the given website.
We simulate Astoria with 3 guards, as this is the recommended
configuration. Fewer guards would reduce the possibility of a
cross-circuit attack (it would be eliminated with 1 guard) but
would only reduce Astoria’s protection against the standard
“direct” correlation attack that it is designed to mitigate.
The resulting number of circuits constructed varied sig-
nificantly depending on the website. If we aggregate the
simulations by website and consider, for each website, the
median number of circuits constructed over all simulated visits
to that website, we see over all websites a minimum of 1
circuit, a median of 8, and a maximum of 54. If we instead
aggregate the simulations by client location and consider, for
each client location, the median number of circuits constructed
over all simulated visits by that client location, that value is 8
circuits for every client location. Thus the number of circuits
constructed is highly dependent on the destination. This result
is unsurprising, as new circuits are constructed either when an
IP address in a new AS is encountered or when a new TCP port
is incompatible with the existing exit’s policy, both of which
are heavily dependent on the website. These results about
circuit construction also show that, for many popular websites,
Astoria frequently provides many new circuit creations and
thus opportunities for a cross-circuit attack.
We evaluate the vulnerability of each simulated website
visit to a direct correlation attack and to a cross-circuit
correlation attack. A visit is considered vulnerable to a direct
attack if there exists some AS A such that, for some stream,
A appears both between the exit relay and the destination
host and between the client and guard. For this evaluation,
we consider an AS to be between two Internet locations B
and C if it is present on either the AS path from B to C or
the AS path from C to B (note that both B and C are thus
considered between B and C). A website visit is considered
vulnerable to a cross-circuit attack if there exists an AS A
such that (i) A is between the exit and the destination host
on the first stream, (ii) A is between the client and the guard
on some stream, and (iii) A is not in a position to perform a
direct attack during the visit as defined previously.
Figure 3 shows how often Astoria is vulnerable to these
attacks as a distribution over all pairs of the 389 client locations
and 2573 websites. It shows that, while Astoria does effectively
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Fig. 3: CDF over pairs of client location and website of the fraction
of simulated visits under Astoria that are vulnerable to a cross-circuit
attack, a direct attack, and a cross-circuit attack but no direct attack.
prevent most direct correlation attacks, for many popular client
locations and websites, users are frequently vulnerable to
deanonymization via a cross-circuit attack. Indeed, while the
median fraction of simulated visits vulnerable to a direct attack
is only 0.03, the median fraction vulnerable to a cross-circuit
attack is 0.2. To more clearly consider the risk added by the
cross-circuit attack to the risk of direct attack, we show the
frequency distribution of visits that are vulnerable to a cross-
circuit attack but not a direct attack. The median frequency of
this cross-circuit-only vulnerability is 0.19, which shows that
the cross-circuit attack is a major added risk.
These results expose a fundamental problem with Astoria’s
strategy of varying the guard depending on the destination.
Choosing two different guards for two different destinations
is useful when for both guards some AS between the client
and guard appears between the exits and destination for one
destination but not the other, which is precisely the situation
when some AS is in a position to perform the cross-circuit at-
4
tack. This suggests that, unless the client can somehow identify
which pairs of connections are vulnerable to being linked as
originating at the same client, it should use few guards and
choose them for circuits oblivious to the destination.
III. TRUST MODEL
A. Trust Policies
We use the definition of network trust given by Jaggard et
al. [17]. A trust belief is a probability distribution that indi-
cates how likely adversaries are to observe traffic at different
network locations. A location is considered to be more trusted
the less likely it is that adversaries are observing it. Although
the belief may be expressed as the adversaries’ success in
compromising any number of relevant factors, such as relay
software or physical location, ultimately it must describe the
probability that the adversaries observe traffic on the virtual
links into and out of the Tor network. A virtual link is an
unordered pair of network hosts, and the entry virtual links
consist of client-guard pairs while the exit virtual links consist
of destination-exit pairs. An adversary is considered to observe
a virtual link if it can observe traffic in at least one direction
between the two hosts. Although the representation of an
arbitrary distribution over all virtual links can be very large,
Jaggard et al. [17] describe how distributions of likely Tor
adversaries can be represented efficiently by aggregating host
locations (e.g., at the AS level) and by identifying a small set of
relevant compromise factors and indicating their dependencies
in a Bayesian network.
To indicate how to trade off vulnerability to different
adversaries, each user adopts a trust policy that pairs her trust
belief with a weight for each adversary. Each weight is a
number in [0, 1] that indicates the relative level of concern
that the user has for the associated adversary. In this work, we
assume that distinct adversaries do not collude. If a user were
worried about two adversaries colluding, she could combine
her beliefs about them into those for a single adversary.
Trust policies are quite general and can easily be used with
many kinds of beliefs and sources of trust information. For
example, previous work that considered each relay to have an
independent and individual probability of compromise [21],
[22] can be represented as a trust policy by including a
single adversary and allowing him to compromise each relay
independently with its given probability. As another example,
previous work that considered as a potential threat each AS and
IXP [13], [15], [24], [29] can be represented as a trust policy by
including each AS and IXP as an adversary with equal weight
and allowing each AS and IXP to compromise with probability
1 all virtual links passing through it. Moreover, as described
by Jaggard et al. [17], trust policies can incorporate beliefs
about a variety of other sources of network compromise,
such as software vulnerabilities, physical cable tapping, and
geographic location.
We do not expect that most individual users will craft their
own trust policies. Indeed, doing so is likely best left to experts
unless the user has strong and idiosyncratic beliefs or concerns.
Rather, we envision that knowledgeable specialists, such as
security researchers and professionals, will provide opinions
about vulnerability to specific kinds of adversaries, and that
institutions, such as governments and consumer advocacy
groups, will incorporate these opinions into trust policies that
are appropriate for their communities. An important special
case of this is that we expect that the Tor Project would select
a default policy that is in the broad interest of all Tor users,
and then would configure the standard Tor client to use it
as well as provide any necessary supporting data through the
Tor network, much as Tor consensuses (i.e., hourly documents
describing available relays) are distributed today by a set of
directory authorities.
We will consider two specific trust policies in our analysis
of TAPS: (i) The Man, which models a single powerful global
adversary whose exact location isn’t known with certainty, and
(ii) Countries, which models each country as an adversary
whose locations are known exactly. Either of these policies
constitutes a plausible default policy as well as that of a
particular user community. We now describe these models.
B. The Man
The Man represents a powerful adversary who may create,
compromise, or coerce the diverse entities that make up the
Tor network. Specifically, we give The Man an independent
probability to observe each Tor relay family, AS organization,
and IXP organization. A relay self-identifies its family in a
descriptor [40] that it uploads to the directory authorities,
and an AS or IXP organization is identified using public
information as being controlled by the same corporate or
legal entity [10], [23]. Without any basis for differentiation,
The Man compromises each AS and IXP organization inde-
pendently with probability 0.1. For relays, we consider that
trust may increase the longer a given relay has been active.
This will not guarantee protection against an adversary that
is willing to contribute persistently-high levels of service to
the Tor network. However, it can require adversaries to either
make their own persistent commitments to the network or to
have compromised others who have done so (and are thus
most committed, experienced, and difficult to attack). For The
Man, we therefore assume each family is compromised by
the adversary independently with probability between 0.02 and
0.1, where the probability increases as the family’s longevity
in Tor decreases. We calculate longevity as follows: First, relay
uptimes are calculated as the exponentially-weighted moving
average of the relay’s presence in a consensus with Running,
Fast, and Valid flags with a half-life of 30 days. A relay
family’s uptime is simply the sum of its relays’ uptimes. The
probability that a family is compromised is then taken as
(0.1− 0.02)/(family uptime + 1) + 0.02.
C. Countries
As an alternative to The Man, the Countries trust policy
includes as an adversary each individual country in the world.
A particular country adversary compromises with probability 1
every AS or IXP that is located in that country and no others.
All country adversaries are given a weight of 1. This policy
illustrates a geographic perspective for Tor security, and it also
demonstrates how we handle multiple adversaries.
IV. SECURITY MODEL AND METRICS
A. Adversary Model
As we have described in our trust model, we are con-
sidering an adversary who may control or observe some Tor
relays and parts of the Internet infrastructure. Note that an
important special case of this is that the adversary might
observe the destination itself. From these positions, we then
analyze the adversary’s success in deanonymizing users via the
following methods: (i) performing a first-last correlation attack,
(ii) identifying the relays used on an observed connection, and
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(iii) observing Tor connections over time and linking them as
belonging to the same user.
As described earlier, first-last correlation attacks are possi-
ble whenever the adversary is in a position to observe traffic
between the client and entry guard as well as between the
destination and exit. In such a situation, we assume that the
adversary can immediately determine that the observed traffic
is part of the same Tor circuit and thereby link the client with
its destination.
Even when the adversary is not in a position to perform a
first-last correlation attack, he still may observe different parts
of the circuit and use traffic correlation to link together those
parts. In such a case, if the observed relays on the circuit are
unusually likely for a particular client to haven chosen (e.g.,
because of atypical trust beliefs), then the adversary may be
able to identify the client even without direct observation. This
is even more of a concern if the adversary applies congestion
or throughput attacks [14], [26] to indirectly identify the relays
on a target circuit. Therefore, we will consider the ability of the
adversary to identify the source and destination of an observed
circuit based on knowledge of its relays.
Finally, it is important to consider multiple connections
over time instead of just one in isolation. Every circuit that
a client creates may give the adversary another opportunity
obtain a sensitive position or may leak more information about
the client. This problem is made worse by the fact that the
adversary may be able to determine when some circuits are
created by the same client. This could happen, for example,
if the adversary repeatedly observes traffic to the destination
and the client interacts with the same online service using a
pseudonym or requests a sequence of hyperlinked documents.
Observe that in both of these examples the linking is done
using similarities in the content of traffic and not via any
weakness in the Tor protocol. Thus we will consider an
adversary who can link observed connections by client.
Note that we are not considering an adversary that can
identify traffic content based only on the timing and volume
of data, that is, an adversary that can perform website finger-
printing [41]. Also, in reality we can expect adaptive adver-
saries who continually learn and shift the allocations of their
resources, but we only analyze static adversaries in this paper.
However, adaptiveness can be captured to a certain extent
already by defining trust policies with respect to adversary
behavior over time. That is, the compromise probability for a
relay or virtual link can represent the probability that it will at
some point during a given period be observed by the adversary.
B. Anonymity Metrics
We evaluate anonymity using two kinds of metrics. The
first kind will give empirical estimates of the speed and
frequency of first-last correlation attacks. The second kind
will provide worst-case estimates for the adversary’s ability
to identify the source or destination of streams that are only
partially observed.
First-last correlation attacks are relatively simple and result
in complete deanonymization, and therefore we are interested
in accurate estimates for how likely they are to occur. More-
over, their success depends on the behavior of the user and of
the circuit-creation algorithm, and therefore we can measure it
empirically via simulation. Following Johnson et al. [23], we
use the following as metrics: (i) The probability distribution
of time until a client is deanonymized via a correlation attack;
and (ii) The probability distribution of the fraction of streams
that are deanonymized via a correlation attack.
Measuring the anonymity of multiple connections that
are only partially observed is more difficult because it isn’t
clear how successful the adversary can be at both linking
separate streams and indirectly identifying relays on a circuit.
Therefore, we take a worst-case approach and consider the
adversary’s ability to guess the source (resp. destination) of a
sequence of streams that have been linked as coming from the
same client (resp. going to the same destination) and for which
the circuit relays have been identified. We measure this ability
as the posterior distribution over network locations. Note that
we do not take into account the fact that the adversary knows
that streams for which the client or destination is unknown
can only travel over virtual links that the adversary does not
observe. Ruling out certain virtual links is more challenging
than just positively identifying traffic on a virtual link because
it requires the false negative rate for traffic correlation to be
extremely low (in addition to the existing requirement that the
false positive be extremely low). Thus, we leave this extension
to our analysis to future work.
V. TRUST-AWARE PATH SELECTION
A. Overview
We describe two variants of the Trust-Aware Path Selection
algorithms (TAPS): (i) TrustAll, which is intended for system-
wide deployment, and (ii) TrustOne, which works with Tor’s
existing path-selection algorithm and is intended for use by a
minority of users. Two TAPS variants are needed to blend in
with two different types of other users: those who do use trust
in path selection and those who do not. The main approach
of both algorithms is to choose guards and exits to avoid
first-last correlation attacks while also blending in with other
users. Parts of this approach are shared with some previously-
proposed path-selection security improvements [7], [13], [22].
However, TAPS includes several novel features that improve
the security and performance issues of these proposals. We
highlight those features before proceeding to describe the
algorithms in detail.
First, TAPS uses an API that encapsulates flexible trust
policies. These trust policies support adversaries from a very
general class of probabilistic models. As previously described,
this class can represent features such as uncertainty, multiple
adversaries, and adversarial control of diverse network ele-
ments.
Second, TAPS clusters client locations and (separately)
destination locations. Each location cluster has a represen-
tative, and all locations in the cluster are treated as if they
were the representative. The main purpose of this clustering
is to prevent leakage of location information over multiple
connections that would occur if paths were selected differently
for each pair of client and destination location. Treating all
members of the cluster as if they were the representative
maintains anonymity within the cluster. A secondary benefit is
reducing the amount of information needed to represent trust
policies by reducing the number of paths to and from guards
and exits that need be considered.
Third, TAPS treats its set of entry guards collectively, that
is, in a way that provides security when multiple circuits, po-
tentially using different guards, are considered. TAPS chooses
each additional guard in a way that minimizes the additional
exposure of its entry paths. Moreover, once a set of entry
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guards is chosen, TAPS doesn’t prefer one guard in the set
over another when creating a connection to a given destination.
This prevents the cross-circuit attack discussed in Sec. II. It
also makes TAPS compatible with the Tor’s current default
configuration of one guard, as it does not depend on being able
to choose the best guard among several for a given destination.
Fourth, TAPS provides a configurable tradeoff between
security and performance by parameterizing how much relay-
selection deviates from ideal load-balancing. The Tor network
is under heavy load relative to its capacity [5], and latency
is dominated by queuing delay at the relays [18]. Thus good
load balancing is essential to maintaining Tor’s performance,
which is itself a crucial factor in Tor’s success.
B. Trust API
The TAPS algorithms work with the trust policies described
in Sec. III via an Application Programming Interface (API).
Jaggard et al. [17] describe how to represent such policies with
a Bayesian network. However, such a representation may not
be the most efficient for the computations needed during path
selection. Therefore, we abstract those computations into an
API, and we describe how they can be efficiently implemented
for The Man and Countries policies in Sec. V-E. We assume
that the API is implemented by the creator of the trust policy.
Several API functions take as an argument a network
location. There are several possible levels of granularity at
which a network location may be defined in TAPS, such as the
Autonomous-System level or the BGP-prefix level. Using more
fine-grained locations will result in more accurate predictions
about the adversaries’ locations and thus improve security, but
it will also result in increased runtime for the TAPS algorithms
(and likely for the API functions as well).
We assume that API users can provide a locations data
structure that (i) allows the locations to be enumerated, (ii)
includes each location’s popularity rank for Tor clients, (iii)
allows IP addresses to be mapped to locations, and (iv)
includes size of each location (e.g., the number of IP addresses
originated by an Autonomous System).
We also assume that API users can provide a relays data
structure that (i) allows relays to be enumerated by unique
identity keys (e.g., as represented by fingerprints [40]), (ii)
includes the data in each relay’s consensus entry (e.g., the
status flags, weight, and IP address), and (iii) includes the data
in each relay’s descriptor (e.g., the exit policy).
The trust API functions are as follows:
1) LOCATIONDISTANCE(loc1, loc2, relays, weights): This
function returns an abstract distance between two locations
that measures the dissimilarity of the adversaries that
appear on the network paths between the locations and
the relays. This distance is the expected sum over relays
weighted by weights of the total weight of adversaries that
appear on one of the virtual links between the relays and
loc1 and loc2 but not the other. This function turns the set
of locations into a metric space.
2) GUARDSECURITY(client loc, guards): This function re-
turns a security score for the use of the given guards as
entry guards by a client in location client loc. The score
must be in [0, 1], and it should represent the expected total
weight of adversaries not present on the paths between
client loc and guards, normalized by the sum of all adver-
sary weights. Thus a higher score indicates higher security.
3) EXITSECURITY(client loc, dst loc, guard, exit): This
function returns a security score for the use of guard
and exit by a client in location client loc to connect to a
destination in dst loc. The score must be a value in [0, 1],
and it should represent the expected total weight of the
adversaries that either are not present on the path between
client loc and guard or are not present on the path between
dst loc and exit (i.e., those not able to perform a correlation
attack), normalized by the sum of all adversary weights.
Thus, again, a higher score indicates higher security.
C. TrustAll
TrustAll consists of two separate processes:
1) CLUSTER: This process is run by the trust-policy provider
(e.g., by the Tor directory authorities for the default policy).
It clusters client and destination locations and makes the
results available to clients. To maintain the anonymity
sets provided by the clusters, this process should execute
infrequently (e.g., every 6 months) and only to reflect
significant changes in the trust on entry and exit virtual
links. It takes the locations and relays data structures as
inputs and produces clusters as output, which is a mapping
from each location chosen as a cluster representative to the
set of locations in its cluster.
2) CONNECT: This process is run by a Tor client. It runs every
time a new connection is requested. It uses the output of
the CLUSTER process, the state of the client (e.g., current
network consensus, current circuits, and client IP address),
locations, and relays. It may create a new circuit or reuse
an existing one.
We now detail these processes.
1) Cluster: Network locations are clustered twice. One
clustering will be applied to the destination’s location during
path selection, and the other will be applied to the client’s
location. The output of a clustering is a partition of network
locations with a single member of each cluster in the partition
designated as that cluster’s representative. Client and destina-
tion clusterings are performed slightly differently because a
single client is likely to visit many destinations. Therefore,
if we were to bias destination clusters, we could potentially
reduce security for all clients on at least one connection, but
we can bias client clusters towards the most likely locations
and improve security for most clients.
a) Clustering destination locations: Destinations are
clustered with a k-medoids algorithm [32], modified to produce
balanced-size clusters. Balance is needed for good anonymity,
as each cluster is an anonymity set. The medoids of the
resulting clusters are used as representatives. The destination-
clustering algorithm takes two parameters: (i) num clusters,
the number of clusters to produce, and (ii) max rounds, the
maximum number of assignment rounds. The clustering is
accomplished as follows:
1) Choose as an initial cluster representative a location uni-
formly at random from locations.
2) Choose the remaining num clusters−1 cluster representa-
tives by iteratively choosing the location with the largest
distance to the representatives already chosen (i.e., the
maximin distance), with distances determined by LOCA-
TIONDISTANCE().
3) Assign locations to cluster representatives by greedily
assigning to the smallest cluster (in terms of the total size
of its locations) at a given time the location closest to its
representative, as measured by LOCATIONDISTANCE().
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4) Recalculate the cluster representatives by determining the
location in each cluster with the smallest average distance
to each other member in the same cluster.
5) Repeat from step (3) if any cluster representative changed
and there have been fewer than max rounds assignment
rounds.
6) Return both the clusters and their representatives.
b) Clustering client locations: Client clustering uses
known popular client locations as cluster representatives and
then clusters the remaining locations in one round. The client-
clustering algorithm takes as input num clusters, the number of
clusters to produce. It creates the set of cluster representatives
by selecting the num clusters most-popular client locations.
The remaining locations are assigned to clusters by greedily
assigning to the smallest cluster at any time as in the destina-
tion clustering.
2) CONNECT: The CONNECT process is invoked when
a Tor client is requested to connect to a destination. We
assume for now that any needed DNS resolution has been
performed, and CONNECT has been given a destination IP
address. Section V-F discusses how DNS resolution might
occur.
The essential mechanism that TrustAll uses to improve se-
curity is to compute security scores for relays in the guard and
exit positions and then to only select the highest-scoring relays
for those positions. Guard security scores are determined with
GUARDSECURITY(), which takes into account any existing
guards when choosing a new one and thus provides security
with respect to the entire guard set. Exit security scores are
determined with EXITSECURITY(), which takes into account
the guard to be used for the circuit and thus can mitigate first-
last correlation attacks.
Given scores for relays in position p ∈ {g, e} (g for guard
and e for exit), the SECURERELAYS() function (Alg. 1) is used
to determine the secure relays, that is, those relays with high-
enough scores to be selected for a given position. Note that
in Alg. 1 REVERSESORT(X,Y ) sorts the entries x ∈ X by
descending values Y [x], and LENGTH(X) returns the number
of entries in X . SECURERELAYS() identifies the highest score
Algorithm 1 TrustAll secure relays to use for position p
function SECURERELAYS(αp, scores, relays, weights)
R← REVERSESORT(relays, scores)
s∗ ← scores[R[0]] . Maximum score
n← LENGTH(relays) . Number of relays
S ← ∅, w ← 0, i← 0
while (scores[R[i]] ≥ s∗αsup )∧
(1− scores[R[i]] ≤ (1− s∗)αscp )∧
(i < n) do . Add all safe relays
S ← S ∪ {R[i]}
w ← w + weights[R[i]]
i← i+ 1
while (scores[R[i]] ≥ s∗αaup )∧
(1− scores[R[i]] ≤ (1− s∗)αacp ) ∧ (w < αwp )∧
(i < n) do . Add acceptable relays
S ← S ∪ {R[i]}
w ← w + weights[R[i]]
i← i+ 1
return S
s∗. It adds to the set of secure relays all safe relays, that
is, relays with scores very close to s∗. Then it considers the
acceptable relays, that is, relays with scores close to s∗ but not
close enough to make them safe. Acceptable relays are added
in descending order of score until the desired fraction of the
total bandwidth in position p is reached. Distinguishing safe
from acceptable relays enables improved load balancing when
there are many highly-trusted choices available.
The parameters defining these sets are given as the list
αp = (α
su
p , α
sc
p , α
au
p , α
ac
p , α
w
p ). α
su
p and α
sc
p are used just
for safe relays, and αaup and α
ac
p are used just for acceptable
relays. Safe and acceptable relays are defined using the same
method, but acceptable relays use less restrictive parameters,
with αaup ≤ αsup and αacp ≥ αscp .
The “uncompromised” parameter αu ∈ {αsup , αaup } is used
to include a relay only if it has a security score s such that s ≥
s∗αu. It must be that αu ≤ 1, or no relays would qualify. αu
is thus the required fraction of the maximum possible expected
weight of adversaries with respect to whom the circuit position
is considered uncompromised. One effect of this constraint is
that relays with completely untrusted paths will not be chosen
if there is at least one other option.
The “compromised” parameter αc ∈ {αscp , αacp } is used to
include a relay only if it has a score s such that 1 − s ≤
(1−s∗)αc. It must be that αc ≥ 1, or no relays would qualify.
αc is thus a limit on the multiple of the minimum possible
expected weight of adversaries to whom the circuit position is
considered compromised. An effect of this constraint is that
if relays with completely trusted paths are available, then no
other options are considered.
αwp represents the desired minimum bandwidth fraction of
relays in position p for the secure relays. It will be reached if
the safe and acceptable relays together constitute at least that
fraction. The weights argument to SECURERELAYS() maps
relays to their positional bandwidth to determine if and when
αwp is reached.
Let client rep be the representative location for the client’s
cluster and dst rep be the representative location for destina-
tion’s cluster. The CONNECT process proceeds as follows:
If the number ` of selected and responsive guards is less
than the number k desired (e.g., k is the value of NumEntry-
Guards [40]), then k− ` new guards are selected. Each guard
is added by (i) creating scores where each potential guard g
has score GUARDSECURITY(client rep, G ∪ {g}), with G is
the current set of guards; (ii) identifying as the set of secure
guards S = SECURERELAYS(αg, scores, P, g weights), where
αg contains the guard security parameters, P contains all
potential guards not currently selected, and g weights contains
the relays’ weights for the guard position; and (iii) randomly
selecting from S with probability proportional to g weights
(i.e. making a bandwidth-weighted choice).
Consider the existing circuits in reverse order of the time
a stream was most-recently attached. If current circuit c is
too dirty, that is, a stream was first attached too long ago
(Tor’s default dirtiness threshold is 10 minutes), then proceed
to the next circuit. Otherwise, let gc be the circuit’s guard, let
αe contain the security parameters for exit selection, let exits
contain all potential exits for the desired connection according
to the criteria Tor currently uses that don’t depend on the
guard (e.g., a compatible exit policy), and let e weights contain
the relays’ weights for the exit position. Let scores contain
the exit scores, with scores[e] = EXITSECURITY(client rep,
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dst rep, gc, e) for all e ∈ exits. Compute the set of secure exit
relays S = SECURERELAYS(αe, scores, exits, e weights). If
the circuit’s exit ec is in S, then reuse the circuit. Otherwise,
proceed to the next circuit.
If no suitable circuit has been found and reused, let
c be the circuit among those that are not too dirty
that most recently had a stream attached, and let gc
be its guard. Choose a new exit e by (i) creating
scores where each e ∈ exits has score EXITSECU-
RITY(client rep, dst rep, gc, e); (ii) identifying as the set of se-
cure exits S = SECURERELAYS(αe, scores, exits, e weights);
and (iii) randomly selecting from S with probability propor-
tional to e weights. Reuse c through its first two hops but
“splice” e onto the end after the middle relay. This effectively
operates as a new circuit, but the handshakes through the first
two hops are not repeated to reduce the latency of creating it.
If no circuit exists that is not too dirty, create a new
circuit as follows: (i) choose a guard g uniformly at random
from the k selected and responsive guards, (ii) choose an
exit e as described for the case that a new exit is being
spliced onto an existing circuit with g as the guard, and (iii)
choose a middle node as Tor currently does given g and
e (e.g., bandwidth-weighted random selection). Note that, in
contrast to vanilla Tor path selection, the guard and exit are
not explicitly prevented from being contained in the same /16
subnet or relay family. Instead, the threat of entry and exit
paths being observed by the same relay family or network
is incorporated into the trust policy, and vulnerable paths are
avoided by TAPS.
D. TrustOne
TrustOne path selection is designed to be used when most
users are not using TAPS and instead are using vanilla Tor
path selection. Thus slightly different behavior is required in
order to fully blend in with the larger group. Also, if most
users do not use trust, then more secure parameters can be
used without impacting performance much.
As with TrustAll, TrustOne consists of a CLUSTER process
and a CONNECT process. CLUSTER is performed in the same
way as in TrustAll. The CONNECT process differs from that
of TrustAll in the following ways:
• SECURERELAYS() doesn’t use the notions of safe and
acceptable relays. It simply orders relays by their score
and chooses the most secure up to the desired bandwidth
fraction. The TrustOne version of this function appears
in Alg. 2. Note that the performance parameter is a
single value (i.e., αp = αwp ). TrustOne doesn’t use the
concept of acceptable relays because it must allow exit
relays to be chosen the same they are in vanilla Tor path
selection, which in TrustOne will happen when αwe = 1.
Also, TrustOne can omit the distinction between safe and
acceptable relays because load balancing is less important
when few users are using trust.
• Given a guard, potential exits (i.e., the set over which
scores are computed with EXITSECURITY()) are chosen
exactly as they are in vanilla Tor path selection, including
in particular the constraints preventing exits and guards
from sharing a family or /16 subnet. This prevents a
TrustOne user from being identified as using non-standard
path selection (e.g., by a middle relay).
Note that a client can choose not to protect the fact the he
is using TrustOne instead of vanilla Tor by setting a desired
Algorithm 2 TrustOne secure relays to use for position p
function SECURERELAYS(αwp , scores, relays, weights)
R← REVERSESORT(relays, scores)
S ← ∅, w ← 0, i← 0
while w < αwp do . Add desired fraction of relays
S ← S ∪ {R[i]}
w ← w + weights[R[i]]
i← i+ 1
return S
exit bandwidth fraction of αwe < 1. He may do this when he
doesn’t believe that revealing his use of TrustOne will reveal
his identity, and using a smaller αwe will improve his security
against a first-last correlation attack by restricting his circuits
to more-secure exits.
E. Trust API implementations
The efficiency of the trust API depends on the type of
trust policies used. For example, a user with trust in individual
relays may only need to store a single trust value for each
relay and perform simple arithmetic computations for the API
functions, while a user with trust in Autonomous Systems
may need to store an entire Internet topology and perform
routing inference. In general, because the API functions return
the expectation of values that can easily be computed if
the compromised relays and virtual links are unknown, they
can be implemented by repeatedly sampling the adversary
distributions. Thus the API functions are compatible with
the Bayesian-network representation of Jaggard et al. [17].
However, policies should use implementations that are efficient
for their specific features.
For The Man policy, the trust API functions need access
to data describing the relay families, AS organizations, IXP
organizations, and the virtual entry and exit links on which
each AS and IXP organization has a presence. The API
functions can easily be implemented efficiently for The Man
because there is a single adversary whose presence on a virtual
link depends on the compromised status of network entities
(i.e., relay families, AS organizations, and IXP organizations)
that are each independently compromised. We implement the
API functions as follows:
• LOCATIONDISTANCE(loc1, loc2, relays,weights): To com-
pute this, consider each r ∈ relays. Let E1 be the set of
network entities that exist between r and both loc1 and
loc2, let E2 be the set of network entities that exist only
between r and loc1, and let E3 be the set of network
entities that exist only between r and loc2. Let pr be the
probability that the adversary is present on one of the paths
from r to loc1 and loc2 but not the other. pr is simply the
probability that (i) no e ∈ E1 is compromised and (ii)
either some e ∈ E2 is compromised and no e ∈ E3 is
compromised or vice versa. The distance is computed as
the weights-weighted sum of pr over r ∈ relays.
• GUARDSECURITY(client loc, guards): Let E be the set of
network entities between client loc and the guards. The
security score computed as the product of the probabilities
that each e ∈ E is individually uncompromised.
• EXITSECURITY(client loc, dst loc, guard, exit): Let E1 be
the set of network entities that exist both between
client loc and guard and between dst loc and exit, let
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E2 be the set of network entities that exist only between
client loc and guard, and let E3 be the set of network
entities that exist only between dst loc and exit. The
security score is the product of the probability that no
e ∈ E1 is compromised and that either no e ∈ E2 is
compromised or no e ∈ E3 is compromised.
For the Countries policy, the trust API functions need
the list of all countries as well as a data structure map-
ping each relay to its country and each virtual link to
the countries it passes through. LOCATIONDISTANCE(loc1,
loc2, relays,weights) is just a weighted sum over r ∈ relays of
the number of countries on which the virtual links {loc1, r}
and {loc2, r} disagree. GUARDSECURITY(client loc, guards)
returns the fraction of countries not containing guards or
on the virtual links between client loc and guards. EXIT-
SECURITY(client loc, dst loc, guard, exit) returns the fraction
of countries either not containing guard and not on the
{client loc, guard} virtual link or not containing exit and not
on the {dst loc, exit} virtual link.
F. Discussion
So far, we have been discussing trust-aware routing to
destination IP addresses. Many or most connections will
require DNS resolution before the destination IP is known.
Exit relays resolve DNS requests in current Tor routing to
prevent linking of client IP address directly to a destination
DNS request. This must also be done in a trust-aware manner,
or there is little point in using trust-aware routing from exit
to destination once the IP address is known. If we rely on
a chosen exit to control the DNS resolution, then, even if
it shares the default trust values, it may not be a good exit
for resolving the intended destination. When doing iterative
DNS resolution from the client, possibly switching to new
circuits depending on the next identified DNS resolver, the
performance overhead could be significant. In this paper, we
assume that primary and backup nameserver ASes are included
with exit-relay descriptors. Assuming that these are typically in
the same AS as or immediately adjacent to the exit, this will
at least make sure that initial DNS requests are trust-aware.
How best to address DNS issues beyond that is outside the
scope of this paper.
We expect the CLUSTER process to be performed by
organizations (e.g., Tor or EFF) and the results distributed
to users who trust their analysis and calculations. End-users
would then only need to perform the CONNECT process. In the
case of TrustAll, security depends on the assumption that many
other users are using the same policy. Therefore, the TrustAll
CONNECT process could be integrated with the standard Tor
release and enabled with a default policy (e.g., The Man or
Countries). However, TrustOne was designed to be used by a
minority of users, and while the algorithm could be included
with Tor, it would not be enabled by default. We analyze the
security and performance of both approaches in the following
sections.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Experimental Setup
We experimentally evaluate the security of the TrustAll and
TrustOne algorithms against The Man using an Internet map,
data about the Tor network, and path-selection simulators for
TAPS and for vanilla Tor. The AS-level routing map and past
state of the Tor network are constructed as described in Sec. II,
but for these experiments we use data from December 2013.
We augment the routing map using sibling information
based on RIPE WHOIS records. We identify IXPs and place
them on these on the AS-level paths using data from the IXP
mapping project [8]. We group ASes into commercial organi-
zations using the results of Cai et al. [10]. We conservatively
group IXPs into organizations based on similarities in their
listings in the Packet Clearing House and PeeringDB (see [23]
for details).
We simulate path selection on past Tor networks using the
Tor Path Simulator (TorPS) [23]. TorPS provides Monte Carlo
simulation of user circuit creation over weeks and months on
the changing Tor network. Each TorPS sample consists of
a sequence of circuits and assignments to those circuits of
requested user connections over the period of simulation. We
use TorPS unmodified to evaluate the security of vanilla Tor,
and we also modify TorPS to use the TAPS path selection
algorithms.
We perform our TorPS simulations for two models of user
behavior: the Typical model, and the IRC model. Johnson et
al. describe these models in detail [23]. The Typical model
consists of four 20-minute user traces obtained from actual
(volunteer) user activity over Tor: (i) Gmail / Google Chat, (ii)
Google Calendar / Docs, (iii) Facebook, and (iv) web search
activity. It includes 205 unique destination IPs and uses TCP
ports 80 and 443. These traces are played every day in five
sessions between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. This results in 2632 TCP
connections per week. The IRC model uses the trace of a
single IRC session to irc.oftc.net on port 6697, which
we observe to resolve to 82.195.75.116 in AS 8365 (TU
Darmstadt, DE). This model repeatedly plays the trace 8 a.m.
to 5 p.m. every weekday. This results in 135 TCP connections
per week.
To evaluate security with respect to The Man, we use it to
draw a sample of the compromised relays and virtual links for
each TorPS sample and consider the security of that sampled
path-selection behavior against that sampled adversary. That
is, we independently assign a compromised status to each
AS organization, IXP organization, and relay family using
the probabilities given in Section IV. We then consider the
anonymity of the circuits in the TorPS sample against the
sampled adversary. We run simulations over the first week of
December 2013. We use 3 guards for all simulations.
B. Location Clusters
The TrustAll algorithm prevents the chosen Tor paths from
revealing client and destination locations beyond their location
clusters. An adversary that can identify the relays in each
position of a circuit (e.g., by running a relay and being selected
as a middle) may use them as evidence for the clusters of
the client and destination. For example, if the adversary is
also observing the exit-destination link, it may be the case
that a given guard and exit would only be used to visit that
destination by members of a given client cluster. As was
shown in Section II, this is an especially powerful attack if the
adversary can additionally link together multiple connections
as belonging to the same (pseudonymous) user.
Thus we must consider the anonymity that is afforded when
a client or destination is known to belong to a given cluster.
In our experiments, we partition all Internet ASes into 200
clusters. This number of clusters allows for significant diversity
in cluster behavior while reducing the anonymity set of roughly
3.7 billion addresses in IPv4 by a factor of 200. We perform
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clustering using as the guard and exit locations the sets of
ASes in which Tor guards and exits were observed to reside
during the six-month period from June 2013 to November
2013, which precedes the simulation period in December 2013.
Following the cluster-formation algorithm given in Sec-
tion V, the 200 client clusters are created by choosing as
cluster representatives the top 200 Tor client ASes reported by
Juen [24]. In the resulting clustering, the median cluster size
in terms of contained addresses is 11,363,072, the minimum
size is 10,840,321, and the maximum size is 118,966,528.
Also as described in Section V, the destinations clusters
were formed slightly differently, using k-medoids clustering
to identify representatives that were best able to minimize
distances between cluster members and their representatives.
The clusters that were the output of this process had a median
of 11,992,641 IPv4 addresses, with a minimum of 11,358,466
and a maximum of 119,068,928. Our clustering algorithm
sought to maximize the number of addresses contained in
each cluster, but it could easily incorporate other anonymity
concerns, such as AS or country diversity.
C. TrustAll Security
First we consider security against The Man when all
users use TAPS as the default path-selection algorithm (i.e.,
TrustAll). In particular we consider the threat of complete
deanonymization via first-last correlation. We used the se-
curity parameters (αsug , α
sc
g , α
au
g , α
ac
g ) = (0.95, 2.0, 0.5, 5.0),
(αsue , α
sc
e , α
au
e , α
ac
e ) = (0.95, 2.0, 0.1, 10.0), and (α
w
g , α
w
e ) =
(0.2, 0.2). Figures 4 and 5 show cumulative distributions for
when and how often deanonymization occurs for a Typical
user in the most popular Tor client AS (6128) over 7 days of
simulation.
We can see that TrustAll significantly reduces the chance
of first-last correlation by The Man as compared to vanilla
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Fig. 6: Security in the Countries model
Tor. Users coming from AS 6128 see the probability of at
least one successful first-last correlation attack drop from 0.7
to about 0.4. Observe that this overall reduction occurs both
because the chance of choosing a compromised guard among
the initial set of 3 is reduced (as seen in the values at 1 day)
and because the chance of choosing additional compromised
guards, precipitated by network churn, is reduced (as seen in
the smaller slopes of the CDF). The results also show that the
median fraction of compromised streams drops from around
0.1 to 0.
Next we consider the security of TrustAll in the Countries
model. In this model, users face multiple country adversaries
(249), each of which deterministically compromises all ASes
and IXPs within its borders. In this setting, users are sometimes
necessarily compromised against those countries that contain
both the source and destination AS. Thus we only consider
the fraction of those streams that are to a destination AS in
different country than the client AS and are “unnecessarily”
compromised by some country. Figure 6 shows the distribution
of this value for a Typical user in AS 6128 (which is in the
US) active over seven days. It shows that TrustAll reduces the
fraction of unnecessarily-compromised streams from a median
of about 0.24 to a median of about 0.17.
Finally, we consider security of IRC users using the Tru-
stOne algorithm when default users are using vanilla Tor. In
this case, the TAPS users choose guards and exits in a way
dseigned to be sufficiently similar to how they are selected in
vanilla Tor. Specifically, guards are selected using αwg = 0.005
and exits are selected using either αwe = 0.005 or α
w
e = 1. The
former weight for exits results in a TrustOne user being 200
times more likely to have chosen a given exit than a vanilla
Tor user. This could be an appropriate setting for a user who
is not concerned with revealing his use of TrustOne and his
trust beliefs. It could also be appropriate for a user who is just
trying to protect anonymity for a single connection considered
in isolation. The weight αwe = 1 results in exit selection by
a TrustOne user that is identical to that of Tor users. This is
an appropriate setting when the user wants to hide his use of
TrustOne and the user’s adversaries may be able to link circuits
together over time as belonging to the same user.
Figures 4 and 5 shows the chance of deanonymization of an
IRC user in AS 6128 via first-last correlation for TrustOne and
vanilla Tor. We can see that TrustOne results in a significantly
lower chance of compromise, from a 0.68 chance for vanilla
Tor users to about 0.2 or 0.1, depending on the exit-selection
parameter αwe . The median compromise rate also drops from
about 0.7 to 0.
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VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The TAPS algorithm was designed to provide tunable
performance while improving users’ security by limiting the
probability that an adversary can observe both sides of a
Tor circuit. We now analyze the effect TAPS has on client
performance and relay load balancing.
A. Tor Network Model
We evaluate the performance effects of TAPS using
Shadow [3], [19], a scalable and deterministic discrete-event
network simulator with a plug-in architecture that enables
it to run real software. Shadow runs the Tor software, and
so we can directly implement our algorithms in Tor’s code
base while increasing our confidence that the application-level
performance effects are realistic.
We configure a private Tor deployment using Shadow and
the large-scale topology produced by Jansen et al. [18]. Our
base configuration consists of 400 Tor relays (including 4
directory authorities and 93 exits), 1380 Tor clients that also
run a simple file-fetching application, and 500 simple file
servers. Of the clients, 1080 are Web clients that are configured
to: choose a random server and download a 320 KiB file from
it; pause for [1, 60] seconds chosen uniformly at random;
and repeat. 120 of the remaining clients are bulk clients that
are configured to repeatedly download a 5 MiB file without
pausing between downloads. Each experiment is configured
to run for 1 virtual hour, which takes about 5 hours on our
machine (using 12 Shadow worker threads) while consuming
40 GiB of RAM.
We also run 180 ShadowPerf clients and model their
behavior after the TorPerf [6] clients that measure and publish
performance over time in the public Tor network. We compared
ShadowPerf to TorPerf performance over several experiments
and found that Shadow is able to model Tor performance
characteristics with reasonable accuracy over a range of file
download sizes.
B. TAPS Implementation Details
We branched Shadow [2] at commit 023055eb5, shadow-
plugin-tor [4] at commit 9eed6a7c5, and Tor at version
0.2.5.2-alpha and modified them to support experimen-
tation with TAPS. The implementation of both the TrustOne
and TrustAll versions of TAPS was done in 1126 lines of C
code in Tor itself.
C. TrustAll Against The Man
Recall that in the TrustAll variation of TAPS, all users
in the network are configured to select paths based on a
common trust policy. We explore the performance of TAPS
under different configurations of the parameters described in
Section V. We use the same values of the parameters defining
safe and acceptable relays in position p ∈ {g, e} (i.e., αsup , αscp ,
αaup , and α
ac
p ) that were used for the security experiments in
Section VI-C. We then adjust the required bandwidth fraction
αw = αwg = α
w
e in order to adjust the amount of load
balancing that happens due to client path selection. Higher
values of αw relax security by requiring clients to consider
more nodes in an attempt to exceed the bandwidth fraction
and allow the algorithm to better distribute load among relays
that have the capacity to support it (relays that are not safe or
acceptable are never chosen in any case). Lower values of αw
reduce the number of relays that a client must consider, which
means they effectively prefer more secure relays and perform
less load balancing. We experiment with different values of
αw to explore these effects.
The results of our experiments are shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7a shows the distribution of the time to receive the
first byte of each download aggregated across all clients in our
network. As can be seen, there is a significant and consistent
improvement in latency to the first byte as αw increases. As
αw increases, client load is better distributed because more
clients will end up choosing high capacity nodes even if they
are not the most secure choice. Similar results are shown for
time to complete the downloads, for Web clients in Figure 7b
and bulk clients in Figure 7c. Also, performance differences are
consistent across the αw settings for both Web and bulk clients,
which we would expect because our path-selection algorithm
is the same in both cases.
Our experiments resulted in decreasing performance as αw
decreases. We expect this to be the case since any deviation
from Tor’s default bandwidth-weighted algorithm will result
in suboptimal load balancing. However, our results indicate
that a clear performance-security trade-off is possible in TAPS
and that the algorithm can be tuned to a desired level of
performance while still removing the least secure relays from
consideration.
A side effect of the decrease in performance is fewer
completed downloads by each client over the course of the
experiment due to our behavior models, as evident in figure 7d.
Related to download times, there is a significant reduction in
the number of downloads for clients (and a long neck for about
20 percent of Web clients). This is likely due to the fact that
these clients, because of their location, consistently choose
low capacity guards and exits that cause their downloads to
receive bad performance. (Clients in the long neck of number
of downloads are also in the long tail of download times.) This
is also a result of our behavior models, in which clients do not
start a new download until the previous one finishes. A richer
behavior model in which some clients start multiple downloads
at a time (e.g., representing users opening multiple tabs or
starting multiple background file transfers) could alleviate this
artifact.
As shown in Figure 7e, the reduction in the number of
downloads also reduces total aggregate network throughput
(bytes written summed across all relays every second). This
again indicates a reduction in the ability of Tor to properly
balance load when all clients in the network use TAPS. Again,
αw = 1.0 performs the closest to vanilla Tor and does not
result in a significant loss in performance, despite removing
the least secure relays during path selection.
Finally, Figure 7f shows the cumulative fraction of band-
width weight from relays that fall outside of the safe thresholds
but that were still considered during path selection. These
relays represent those that were within the acceptable thresh-
olds but not within the safe thresholds. Recall that TrustAll
selects relays in this acceptable zone one at a time, from most
to least secure, until the desired consensus weight fraction
αw is reached. As expected, the more performance that is
demanded (i.e., as αw increases), the more relays outside
of the safe thresholds must be used to reach the desired
performance. Our results indicate that there are settings of
αw that result in performance nearly as good as Tor’s default
performance-optimized algorithm, while also taking security
into consideration.
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Fig. 7: Performance of the TrustAll variation of TAPS against The Man policy, varying required bandwidth fraction αw
D. TrustAll Against Countries
The experimental results discussed above were obtained
using The Man policy. For completeness, we also experi-
mented with the same parameters using the Countries policy.
We confirmed that the same trends are present against the
Countries policy as were discussed above, and the results
increased our confidence in the conclusions drawn about the
performance of TAPS. (The full set of graphs are excluded for
space reasons.)
E. Trading Security for Performance
Figure 8 demonstrates how TAPS directly trades perfor-
mance for security according to the parameter αw. Figure 8a
shows the security-performance tradeoffs of TrustAll against
The Man policy for various values of αw. Shown in the figure
are two performance metrics: “Client Download Time” rep-
resents the median across all clients of the median download
time for each client; “Relay Throughput” represents the median
application throughput in terms of bytes written per second,
accross all relays over all seconds during the experiments. Both
of these metrics are normalized with respect to vanilla Tor,
meaning that values closer to 1.0 indicates that TAPS achieves
performance more similar to that achieved by vanilla Tor. Also
shown in Figure 8a are the “Probability of Compromise” and
the “Stream Compromise Rate” as metrics of security. The
metrics are again normalized with respect to vanilla Tor, so
that values closer to 0 are less similar to vanilla Tor and
indicate higher security. As is clear in the figure, as the tradeoff
parameter αw increases, both of the performance metrics
improve while both of the security metrics get worse. This
is expected: as more relays are used to reach the performance
requirements of αw, it is more likely that insecure relays or
relays that exist on insecure paths will be selected and used in
a circuit.
A similar analysis applies to the Countries policy, the
results for which are shown in Figure 8b. The security metrics
include the median fraction of “Unnecessarily Compromised
Streams”, where the source and destination of a stream do
not exist in the same country and yet the stream was still
compromised, and the median number of countries with which
the client unnecessarily had a compromised circuit. The per-
formance metrics are as above. The same basic trends hold
for the Countries policy: as αw increases and the number of
potentially unsafe relays considered for a path increases, so
does the number of avoidable stream compromises and the
number of countries to which a given client is unnecessarily
compromised. In all cases, however, security improves with
respect to vanilla Tor while performance decreases depending
on the tunable setting of the tradeoff parameter αw.
F. TrustOne Against The Man
In order for TrustAll to be effective, most clients must use
it. If only a minority of clients use trust, then they should use
TrustOne in order to blend in with vanilla-Tor users. They can
also take advantage of their minority status by using higher-
security parameters without affecting Tor’s load balancing
much.
We demonstrate the performance of TrustOne by configur-
ing 68 of our Web clients and 5 of our bulk clients to run the
TrustOne algorithm with αwg = 0.005 and α
w
e ∈ {0.005, 1.0};
the other parameter settings are as in the TrustAll experiments.
All other clients use the vanilla-Tor path-selection algorithm.
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Fig. 8: Trading performance and security in TrustAll with αw
metric αw = 0.005 αw = 1.0 vanilla
Time to First Byte 0.870, 1.548 0.783, 1.694 0.690, 1.419
Time to Last Byte 320KiB 3.806, 3.785 2.685, 3.255 2.172, 2.597
Time to Last Byte 5MiB 39.825, 29.342 35.203, 14.395 35.777, 20.658
Tor Throughput (MiB/s) 98.635, 4.893 99.699, 5.387 100.660, 4.250
TABLE II: Statistical summary (median, standard deviation) of
performance for TrustOne
Thus the TrustOne clients choose secure guards, and they
either choose exits identically to vanilla-Tor users in order
to blend in (αwe = 1.0) or don’t attempt to hide their use of
TrustOne and instead choose exits very securely (αwe = 0.005).
Table II provides a statistical summary of the performance
of the vanilla and trust clients. Note that the results for
αw ∈ {0.005, 1.0} come from two separate TrustOne experi-
ments, the vanilla-Tor results come from another experiment
with no TrustOne clients, and the reported download times
for αw ∈ {0.005, 1.0} are only for TrustOne clients. Across
all three client performance metrics (time to first byte, and
time to last byte of Web and bulk downloads), we see only
a small drop in client performance for both settings tested.
Although our sample size is small, both settings of αwe resulted
in similar performance for the trusted user set. This indicates
that performance for those clients was due to the capacity
and congestion of their guard nodes (which they chose using
a secure value of αwg ). Also shown in Table II are results
showing that relay throughput in the TrustOne experiments
was not significantly lower than in the vanilla Tor experiment
(relay throughput is over all relays and thus in the TrustOne
experiments includes traffic from both trust-aware and vanilla
clients). This is attributable to a relatively small change in
the load balancing across the network since only the trust
users deviate from the optimized load balancing algorithm.
Our results indicate that little performance is lost from using
the TrustOne algorithm when a relatively small set of users
are doing so.
VIII. TRUST ERRORS
Because the client’s paths depend on her beliefs and may
not be accurate, it is important to investigate the effects of
errors in the client’s beliefs on her security. Here, we do
that experimentally by considering a variety of mismatches
between client trust beliefs and the actual adversary. We look at
three client behaviors against nine different actual adversaries
for a single location (AS 6128) over one week. We also look
at our Typical client in 401 different locations (the client ASes
observed by Juen [24] and in our AS-level map for December
2013) with trust beliefs corresponding to The Man, but where
the actual adversary distribution is one of a selected set of
other behaviors.
The client might also have beliefs about the structure of
the network. Errors in those may have significant impacts on
the client’s security if, for example, the client believes that an
untrustworthy AS organization does not contain an AS that it
actually does. We focus our experiments here on errors in trust
beliefs, however.
We consider three different client behaviors: The Typical
and IRC clients with The Man policy are as described above.
We also consider a client with Typical network behavior who
chooses paths based on trust beliefs that match the Countries
adversary.
These client properties are combined with various adver-
saries, which may or may not match the client’s beliefs and
policies:
Type 0: The adversary is The Man adversary described above.
Type 1: The probability of compromise is increased, relative to
The Man, by a factor of 1.25 for AS/IXP organizations, lone
ASes, and relay families. This reflects the possibility that the
client uniformly underestimates the adversary’s capabilities.
Type 2a: This is the same as The Man except ASes that are
not part of any organization are not compromised.
Type 2b: This is the same as The Man except ASes that are
not part of any organization are compromised with probability
0.05.
Type 3: For each run, half of the AS organizations and half of
the IXP organizations are compromised with probability 0.15,
and the others are compromised with probability 0.05. For
efficiency, an AS that is not part of an AS organization is only
assigned a compromised status when it is first encountered
on a virtual link during analysis. Upon its initial observation,
such an AS is assigned one of 0.15 and 0.05 as a compromise
probability using a fair coin, and then it is compromised with
that probability.
Type 4: The adversary is the same as The Man except longer
uptime increases the compromise probability for a relay family
(e.g., because of the increased chance of unpatched software).
In particular, the compromise probability for a relay family
with uptime tf is 0.1− (0.1− 0.02)/(tf + 1).
Type 5: The adversary compromises each relay with probability
0.1 and each virtual link with probability 0.3439 = 1− 0.94.
(The latter value is chosen to approximate the probability of
compromising ASes/IXPs independently. On the virtual links
that we consider, the median number of ASes/IXPs is four,
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Client: Typical, against The Man
Adv.→ 0 1 2a 2b 3 4 5 6 7
TTFC > 7 > 7 > 7 > 7 > 7 > 7 .01 > 7 > 7
Prob. .4 .49 .4 .4 .41 .47 .68 .47 .47
Client: IRC, against The Man
Adv.→ 0 1 2a 2b 3 4 5 6 7
TTFC > 7 4.17 > 7 > 7 > 7 > 7 .07 > 7 > 7
Prob. .41 .5 .41 .41 .41 .48 .71 .49 .48
Client: Typical, against Countries
Adv.→ 0 1 2a 2b 3 4 5 6 7
TTFC .38 .01 .38 .38 .38 .26 .0 .25 .38
Prob. .58 .66 .56 .57 .57 .6 .82 .61 .58
TABLE III: Median time to first compromise (in days) and prob-
ability of compromise for three different client behaviors and nine
different actual adversary distributions. Data are from 10,000 simu-
lations of a client in AS 6128 running for 7 days.
Adv. Med. TTFC Med. Prob. Med. Frac.
min./med./max. min./med./max. min./med./max.
2a .01 > 1 > 1 .21 .45 .66 .0 .0 .09
4 .01 > 1 > 1 .27 .49 .69 .0 .0 .11
5 .0 .01 .01 .59 .66 .79 .1 .13 .16
TABLE IV: Statistics (minimum, median, and maximum) on the
median times to first compromise (in days), compromise probability,
and fraction of paths compromised over 10,000 trials for each of 401
client locations running for one day each against a selected set of
adversaries. The clients choose paths against The Man; the actual
adversary is shown in the first column.
although these are not necessarily from distinct organizations.)
Type 6: The adversary is the same as The Man for ASes/IXPs.
For relays and relay families, the adversary compromises
nontrivial families with probability 0.1 and individual relays
that are not part of a nontrivial family is 0.05.
Type 7: The adversary is the same as The Man for ASes/IXPs.
For relays and relay families, the adversary compromises
families with probability pmax − (pmax − pmin)2−(fsize−1),
where pmin and pmax are the minimum (0.02) and maximum
(0.1) probabilities of family compromise for The Man and
fsize is the number of relays in the family.
Table III shows the median time to first compromise
(TTFC) in days and the probability that some circuit is com-
promised for the three different client types and nine different
adversary distributions noted above. In each case, we take the
client to be in AS 6128. The data are obtained from 10,000
simulations of client behavior from 12/1/13 to 12/7/13. Values
of “> 7” for the TTFC indicate that the value is at least seven
days, the length of these experiments.
Table IV shows various compromise statistics for a Typical
client who chooses paths based on beliefs that match The
Man against three different adversary distributions. For each
of the 401 client locations, we ran 10,000 simulations and
took the median TTFC, compromise probability, and fraction
of compromised paths for that location. The table shows the
minimum, median, and maximum of these per-location median
values. Values of “> 1” for the TTFC indicate that the value
is at least one day, the length of these experiments.
Comparing Table III with Fig. 4, we see that when the
client in AS 6128 chooses paths against The Man, the use of
TAPS increases her security, compared with vanilla Tor, against
adversaries that are related to The Man even though the
client is wrong about the exact nature of the adversary. More
precisely, this is true for all of the adversary types considered
in this section other than Type 5, which is the adversary that
independently compromises each relay and virtual link and is
the only type that does not compromise the network based on
organizations and families. When the adversary is actually of
Type 5, Tables III and IV show that it is able to do quite well
against the client over many locations and client behaviors.
IX. OBTAINING AND PROPAGATING TRUST
We consider as an example how much data must be stored
and communicated to implement The Man policy. First, the
client must be able to determine the cluster of itself and
its destinations. With 46368 ASes in the network map used
for TAPS analysis, 200 client clusters, and 200 destination
clusters, 182 KiB suffice for each client to determine the
needed clusters. Second, to choose guards and exits, the client
needs the ability to determine the AS and IXP organizations
on any virtual link either between their cluster representative
and a guard or between a destination-cluster representative
and an exit. There are only 359 IXPs, and so an AS or IXP
organizations can be specified in two bytes. For data gathered
December 2013, all guards are within 603 ASes, all exits are
within 962 ASes, and the average number of AS and IXP
organizations on a virtual link is 4.05. Thus a list of the
entities on all the relevant virtual links for a given client is
would be 1.68 MiB. Routing changes could be propagated
daily or weekly with much smaller updates once the full data
is obtained.
X. RELATED WORK
An early proposals to use trust for Tor routing came from
Øverlier and Syverson [31], who suggest choosing guards
“based on trust in the node administrator”. However, they do
not develop this idea. A mathematical notion of trust in Tor
was introduced by Johnson and Syverson [21]. They formalize
trust as the probability of compromise of a relay, and they
provide an analysis of end-to-end correlation attacks when
there are just two different levels of trust. This model was
later used by Johnson et al. [22] to produce a “downhill” Tor
path-selection algorithm that can handle arbitrary trust levels at
the relays and is designed to prevent traffic-correlation attacks.
Jaggard et al. [17] greatly expand this probabilistic notion of
trust by describing how to identify compromise factors that
can apply to the links as well as the nodes, such as AS
organizations, legal jurisdictions, and router software. They
focus on expressing such rich trust models, while in this paper
we focus on using these models in a path-selection algorithm
that improves security.
Another approach to trust for anonymous communication
is to explicitly leverage social network relations. Danezis et
al. [12] describe this for interactive but low-volume anonymous
communication. Concentrating on low-volume applications
allowed them to make use of padding, which is generally too
expensive and too ineffective for some of the more popular
applications that use Tor. Mittal et al. [27] describe a social-
network onion-routing architecture designed for Web browsing
and other interactive communications that adds resistance to
an active adversary. This design uses potentially much longer
paths than Tor’s three hops to achieve intended security, and
performance may suffer significantly as a result of this and
other features of the design.
The threat of AS adversaries to Tor was first recognized
by Feamster and Dingledine [15]. Their analysis shows that
entry and exit paths through the network are likely to be
simultaneously observed by a single AS 10% to 30% of the
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time, depending on the locations of the client and destination.
They suggest that clients choose entry and exit nodes to avoid
traversing the same AS upon entry and exit. Edman and
Syverson [13] update this work and show that, despite the
growth of the network from about 30 to about 1300 relays, the
risk of denanonymization by a single AS is not reduced. They
also show how to efficiently implement the AS-aware path
selection suggested by Feamster and Dingledine by providing
clients with routing data that enables them to infer AS-level
routing paths. Murdoch and Zielin´ski [29] introduce IXPs as
a potential adversary. They show that an IXP can correlate
traffic even at low rates of sampling. Link adversaries at
both ASes and IXPs were extended by Johnson et al. [23]
to consider adversaries controlling multiple ASes or IXPs,
such as companies that own many IXPs. Akhoondi et al. [7]
present an alternate method for clients to efficiently infer the
ASes between hosts for purposes of choosing Tor paths that
avoid allowing the same AS to observe entry and exit traffic.
Juen [24] presents another method for this purpose, this time
with the addition of inferring IXPs on those paths. All of the
preceding suggestions for AS-aware tor path selection neglect
key details, such as how circuits are reused and how to handle
destinations with no path that avoids putting an AS on both
sides. In addition, Juen et al. [25] show that methods of
AS inference for detecting Tor paths vulnerable to AS-level
compromise suffer from significant false-positives and false-
negatives when compared to direct traceroute measurements.
Nithyanand et al. [30] present Astoria, which is the first
reasonably-complete network-aware Tor path-selection algo-
rithm. As described in Section II, like other previous work on
network-aware path selection, Astoria is only secure when each
connection is analyzed independently. DeNASA [9], by Barton
and Wright, is another recent and fully-specified network-
aware Tor path-selection algorithm. DeNASA only considers
as adversaries individual ASes, and chooses to just protect
against the eight ASes that are most likely to be in a position to
deanonymize a connection. DeNASA also doesn’t consider the
specific destination when constructing a circuit, which allows
it to use pre-built circuits for speed but makes it unable to
protect connections to destinations with paths dissimilar from
the pre-selected set used for exit selection. However, DeNASA
is still vulnerable to leakage about a client’s AS across repeated
connections (assuming its guard and exit-selection algorithms
are jointly used).
Sun et al. [36] show that traffic correlation attacks on Tor
are effective even when the attacker observes paths in different
directions on the entry and exit sides. They also demonstrate
the application of BGP hijacking and interception attacks to
redirect Tor traffic to malicious ASes in order to deanonymize
users. Tan et al. [37] extend this analysis and show that 90%
of Tor’s bandwidth is vulnerable to BGP hijacking, and they
propose as a defense a set of monitors to detect routing attacks
and notify Tor clients to avoid the affected relays.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show how previous network-aware Tor
path-selection algorithms are vulnerable to attacks across
multiple Tor connections. We present TAPS, a path-selection
algorithm for Tor that is not vulnerable to such attacks and that
enables clients to avoid traffic-correlation attacks by using trust
that they have in network elements. We present two global-
adversary models, analyze the security and performance of
TAPS against these adversaries, and consider both trust errors
and trust propagation.
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